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FURTHER EVIDENCE ON AUDITOR SELECTION BIAS AND THE BIG 4 PREMIUM 
 
Abstract 
 
In recent years, the competitiveness of the corporate audit market has received a great deal of attention from 
policy makers and academic researchers alike. Among the main issues of concern is whether large auditors 
command a premium when setting fees for statutory audit services, and whether this is symptomatic of a lack 
of competition in the market for audit services or results from differences in the quality of the product 
offered by the big 4.  A large number of academic studies based on independent data sets find a positive OLS 
coefficient on a large auditor binary variable in audit fee regressions and interpret this as evidence of a 
premium. However, recent research on UK private companies suggests that the large auditor premium is 
explained by auditor self-selection bias and that when this is controlled for using a two-stage Heckman 
procedure, the premium vanishes.  In this paper we examine some of the difficulties in properly specifying 
the audit fee equation and discuss potential sensitivity of the estimates provided by the two-step model.  We 
re-estimate audit fee equations for over 36,000 UK private companies employing a relatively new 
development in the applied econometrics literature – propensity score matching.  In addition, we employ 
formal decomposition methods, which have not been used in the audit literature to date, to provide a more 
comprehensive analysis of big 4 premiums. Our results suggest that evidence of the large auditor premium 
vanishing when selection bias is controlled for do not seem to generalise and that the Heckman two-step 
procedure is highly sensitive to model specification.  Matching results suggest that auditees of similar size, 
risk and complexity pay significantly higher fees to big 4 auditors. 
 
 
Keywords: Audit fees; large auditor premium; propensity score matching; decomposition methods; selection 
bias 
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FURTHER EVIDENCE ON AUDITOR SELECTION BIAS AND THE BIG 4 PREMIUM 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
In recent years, the competitiveness of the market for audit services has been the subject of considerable 
attention from the accounting profession, regulators and academic researchers.  Some of the main issues of 
concern are whether large auditors command a premium when setting fees for external corporate audit 
services and if so, whether such a premium is symptomatic of a lack of competition in the audit market or 
results from a higher quality product in competitive markets.  In the UK, the Department for Trade and 
Industry and the Financial Reporting Council recently commissioned an extensive investigation of these 
issues (Oxera, 2006) and concluded that higher fees have resulted from higher concentration and that 
auditor reputation is important to companies, but that some large UK firms have no effective choice of 
auditor due to significant barriers to entry. 
The empirical analysis in the Oxera report suggests that big 4 auditors are able to charge an 
average premium of around 18% for UK quoted companies.  Furthermore, since the seminal contribution 
of Simunic (1980), there has not been universal agreement on this issue, but a large number of studies 
using independent data sets from a variety of markets and countries find a persistent positive OLS 
regression coefficient for top-tier (big 8, big 6 and big 4) auditors, for companies of various sizes, and 
interpret this as evidence of a premium (e.g., Pong and Whittington, 1994; Bandyopadhyay and Kao, 
2004; Seetharaman et al., 2002; McMeeking et al., 2007; Ghosh and Lustgarten, 2006; Clatworthy and 
Peel, 2007). A survey of the international empirical evidence (Moizer, 1997, p. 61) reported that ‘the 
results point to a top tier fee premium of between 16 to 37%’; while Hay et al. (2006, p. 176) note, in a 
meta-analysis of 147 published audit fee studies, that ‘the results on audit quality strongly support the 
observation that the Big 8/6/5/4 is associated with higher fees.’ 
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Notwithstanding the relatively persistent empirical finding of a large auditor premium in prior 
studies, recent research has investigated the important issue of the non-random selection of auditors by 
clients and its impact on observed large auditor premiums (Ireland and Lennox, 2002; Hamilton et al., 
2005; and McMeeking et al., 2006).  In a study of UK private companies, Chaney et al. (2004) fail to find 
a large auditor premium after they control for potential self-selection.  Using OLS, they find a significant 
positive coefficient on a large auditor (big 5) binary variable, but when they employ a two-stage Heckman 
procedure to control for potential self-selection of auditors conditional on observable and unobservable 
client characteristics, the premium vanishes.  Indeed, they conclude (p. 67) that ‘if big 5 auditees had 
chosen non-big 5 auditors, their audit fees would have been higher.’  Similar findings were reported by the 
same authors for a sample of US listed firms (Chaney et al., 2005). Given that previous studies report the 
absence of a premium after controlling for selection bias across different countries (the US and UK) and 
different audit markets (listed and private firms), their findings are of key import, since they imply that a 
large number of previous studies may have erroneously reported large auditor premiums. 
The purpose of this paper is to present new evidence on the big 4 auditor premium and the effects 
of auditor selection for a large sample (36,674) of private UK firms.  The audit market for private limited 
companies in the UK is more competitive than that for listed companies since the big 4 have a 
substantially lower market share and smaller auditors are less likely to be excluded (as in the listed 
market) from audits because of auditee size considerations. Hence any identified premium in this market 
is less likely to be related to oligopoly power, but rather to perceived auditor quality differences (such as 
those associated with auditor quality and reputation effects). Our cross-sectional sample is the largest yet 
employed in the UK private company audit market and the richness of our data set allows us to employ a 
variety of estimators to subject the issue of self-selection bias to considerable scrutiny. 
 We conduct a rigorous analysis of big 4 premiums using formal decomposition measures which 
have not previously been employed in the accounting and auditing literature.  Previous analyses of the 
Heckman two-step findings suggest that they are highly sensitive to model specification, in contrast to 
OLS single-stage estimates (Hartman, 1991; Stolzenberg and Relles, 1997).  We highlight a number of 
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potential problems associated with the Heckman method, which may lead to doubts concerning the 
robustness of reported empirical findings on the large auditor premium.  In particular, the econometrics 
literature emphasises the difficulties in properly ‘identifying’ the audit fee equation using the two-step 
Heckman model if the initial auditor selection equation shares common regressors with the audit fee 
equation and relies on the non-linearity assumption to identify the audit fee equation.  This may lead to the 
Heckman method yielding results that are not robust and may result in severe collinearity problems (e.g., 
Little and Rubin, 1987; Puhani, 2000).  Our analysis attempts to address these problems by examining the 
effect of sample selection, model specification and identification on the Heckman results. 
 A related approach adopted in the econometrics literature for overcoming self-selection bias 
involves matching procedures, particularly propensity score matching methods (e.g., Black and Smith, 
2004; Simonsen and Skipper, 2006), which have yet to be employed in the auditing literature.  Using these 
methods, we present new evidence on the large auditor premium using matched samples of companies 
audited by big 4 and non-big 4 auditors.  Matching ensures that any observed premium is based on 
samples of comparable companies in that any big 4 auditee is matched with a non-big 4 auditee with 
similar observable characteristics. 
 Our results suggest that two-step corrections for selection bias in audit fee models are highly 
sensitive to model specification – a finding consistent with empirical results reported in applications of 
such models in other fields (e.g., Winship and Mare, 1992; Stolzenberg and Relles, 1997; Leung and Yu, 
2007).  Using more robust matching estimators, we conclude that the big 4 premium is still present after 
controlling for observable audit client characteristics and that models attributing the premium to 
unobservable characteristics should be treated with a degree of caution. 
 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  In the next section, we outline general 
modelling issues and assumptions; section three describes our empirical models and data while our 
empirical results based on single stage, two-step and matching estimators follow in section four.  The 
paper concludes in section five with a summary, implications and suggestions for future research. 
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MODELLING ISSUES AND THE BIG 4 PREMIUM 
Evidence on the Premium in Prior Literature  
 To date, the auditing literature has advanced several (non-independent) reasons for large auditors 
charging higher fees, including the big 4 being associated with established reputations, higher quality 
audits, higher training costs, higher potential losses (‘deeper pockets’) and the occupation of a position of 
oligopoly in many audit markets (Moizer, 1997).  Craswell et al. (1995, p. 298) note that in competitive 
markets, the large auditor premium relates to big 4 (formerly big 8, big 6) ‘investments in brand name 
reputation for higher quality audits’.  In the market for the largest (particularly international) companies, 
however, smaller auditors, due to their lack of technical resources and geographical coverage, are unable 
to compete; hence such auditees are limited in choice to big 4 auditors only.  For example, the Oxera 
report (2006, p. i) concluded there were significant barriers to entry in the sub-market for large UK quoted 
companies, ‘including the high cost of entry, a long payback period for any potential investment, and 
significant business risks when competing against the incumbents (big 4) in the market’. 
 Whether or not the auditee market is competitive (i.e., amongst the big 4) for the largest 
companies, or subject to cartel pricing behaviour, is clearly difficult to test, since no realistic 
counterfactuals exist.  In the current study of UK private companies, the market is a priori competitive in 
that big 4 concentration is relatively low (8% of audits in our sample), with both big 4 and non-big4 
auditors being represented across a wide size range of auditees.  Hence, in such a market any observed 
premiums are more likely to be related to perceived and/or actual audit quality effects.1 
 We therefore assume a competitive market using the seminal audit fee framework of Simunic 
(1980) and developed by Pong and Whittington (1994).  Simunic (1980) hypothesises that audit fee 
variations are associated with audit production functions, loss exposure and audit quality (modelled with 
reference to auditee size, complexity, risk and auditor [big 4] quality).  Pong and Whittington (1994) posit 
                                                      
1 For example, Blokdijk et al. 2006 find that the audit input mix differs between (then) big 5 and non big 5 auditors 
such that the quality of audits by the big 5 is actually higher, even though the total effort exerted is similar.  Francis 
et al. (1999) report that Big 6 auditors constrain income-increasing discretionary accruals more than smaller auditors 
while Lennox (1999) finds that large auditors’ reports are more accurate than smaller auditors.  
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that supply is related to auditors’ cost functions, which is largely associated with the quantity of 
work/effort.  Given the minimum audit standard is prescribed by statute and professional standards, Pong 
and Whittington (1994) state that the demand for audit is relatively inelastic.  Furthermore, as noted by 
Simunic (1980, p. 170), in terms of product differentiation, the audit market is hedonic; i.e., differentiated 
audit products (quality) are not directly observed and ‘the principal differentiation characteristic of the 
service is likely to be the identity of the supplier … it is the Big Eight firms which enjoy visibility and 
brand name recognition among buyers.’ 
 The market for audit services among UK private companies is an interesting context in which to 
test for the presence of a large auditor premium.  In addition to the more competitive nature of the supply 
side of the audit market, there are arguments both for and against the prediction that a big 4 premium will 
be observed.  As argued by Chaney et al. (2004), lower agency costs for private firms (which are more 
closely held), potentially less reliance on financial statements by outsiders and lower litigation risk for 
auditors (compared to listed firms) would point to lower demand for high quality audit services, and thus 
to no expectation of a premium.  By contrast, owners of private firms may wish to signal credibility of 
their financial statements should they wish to sell their stake and the absence of market values may make 
information provided by the financial reporting process more important (e.g. for managerial performance 
measures).  In addition, there is evidence that newly public firms are able to attract cheaper debt capital if 
they appoint a large auditor (Pittman and Fortin, 2004), suggesting that more expensive audit fees may be 
recovered through the payment of lower rates of interest.  
 
Statistical Specifications and Assumptions 
Though we focus our discussion on the big 4 premium, our discussion is applicable to other areas 
of accounting and business research where selection bias is a potential problem.  We divide companies 
into those companies with a big 4 auditor and those without.  This division is indexed below by BIG4 and 
NON and represented by a dummy variable (D) taking the value 1 if the auditee has a big 4 auditor and 
zero otherwise.  The existing literature typically assumes that the natural log of audit fees (F) depends on 
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K variables (Xk k=1,..,K) capturing important client characteristics (principally measures of auditee size, 
complexity and risk) and employs a linear regression of the form: 
  ln FBIG4=a+b+SkbkX k BIG4 + e BIG4  For big 4 clients (D=1)  1. 
  ln FNON=a+SkakXkNON + eNON   For non big 4 clients  (D=0) 2. 
where the error term (e ) reflects the unobservable random determinants of audit fees.  Audit fees may 
vary between these groups because the observable characteristics (X) are different and/or because their 
impact on audit fees (b¹0, ak¹bk) are different. As noted by Pong and Whittington (1994) and Chaney et 
al. (2004), it is likely that big 4 auditors are better equipped to audit larger, more complex clients, though 
this may be offset in part by higher fixed costs from training audit staff. 
 Initially we assume (as in many previous studies) for our single stage conventional estimates that 
any unobservable auditee characteristics are the same for (D=1) and (D=0) so the errors have the same 
distribution for each type of auditor. A problem arises since we cannot directly compare the fees paid 
under each regime because we only observe a company as a client of either a big 4 or a non-big 4 auditor, 
but not both, i.e., we do not observe the counterfactual outcome.2 But this problem can be overcome by 
assuming that the errors in each equation have the same distribution and that the values of the regressors 
are unimportant in respect of computing the counterfactuals; however, if there are large and significant 
differences in the values of the regressors for D=1 and D=0 then it is unreasonable to extrapolate between 
them.3 
If the OLS estimates of the parameters are (a, ak) for the non big 4 auditees and (a, b, bk) for the 
big 4 auditees, then the predicted (log of) audit fees for a big 4 auditee, firm i, in each ‘regime’ are:  
·
1
ln
K
NONi k ki
k
F a a X
=
= + å  (the counterfactual value) and  ·
1
ln
K
BIGi k ki
k
F a b b X
=
= + + å (the actual value).  
                                                      
2 Another potential concern is the use of linear functions. It may be possible for the same non-linear audit fee 
equation to apply to both types of auditee so that any observed big 4 premium might be entirely ‘explained’ by 
auditees’ different characteristics.  A big 4 premium can still be predicted if linear approximations are estimated at 
markedly different points on the curve. 
3 For example, at the limit, it would be inappropriate to compare the audit fees paid by large and small companies if 
all large auditees employed big 4 auditors while all small ones employed non-big 4 auditors. 
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 The big 4 premium is then the difference: · ·
1
ln ln ( )
K
BIGi NONi k k ki
k
F F b b a X
=
- = + -å .  Studies testing for a 
premium using a binary variable in a single regression assume that the slope coefficients for the big 4 and 
non-big 4 are identical (i.e., 
1
( )
K
k k ki
k
b a X
=
-å =0) so the premium is b.  In practice we compute these 
statistics for two ‘typical’ (average) auditees; the first has the values for the regressors equal to the mean 
values for the big 4 auditees ( kBIGX ) and the other the mean values for the non big 4 auditees ( kNONX ).
4  
This gives two estimates (P) of the big 4 premium: 
4
1
( )
K
BIG k k kBIG
k
P b b a X
=
= + -å   and 4
1
( )
K
NON k k kNON
k
P b b a X
=
= + -å    3. 
PBIG4 is the predicted fees paid by a ‘typical’ big 4 auditee to a big 4 auditor minus the predicted fees paid 
by the same auditee to a non big 4 auditor.  Although not used in previous auditing research, these 
statistics are widely used elsewhere as part of an Oaxaca-Blinder (OB) decomposition analysis (see e.g. 
Greene, 2003, p. 53 for further discussion).  The OB decomposition writes the difference in the means of 
the log of audit fees as: 
4 4 4 4 4
1 1
ln ln ( ) ( )
K K
BIG NON k kBIG kNON k k kBIG BIG BIG
k k
F F a X X b b a X EXPLAINED P
= =
- = - + + - = +å å  4. 
4
1 1
ln ln ( ) ( )
K K
BIG NON k kBIG kNON k k kNON NON NON
k k
F F b X X b b a X EXPLAINED P
= =
- = - + + - = +å å  5. 
 This decomposition emphasises that the observed actual difference in audit fees can partly be attributed to 
the different characteristics of the big 4 and non big 4 auditees and partly by the big 4 premium.  Recent 
developments in the auditing literature, however, point out that OLS estimates of the big 4 premium are 
potentially biased because auditors are not appointed randomly and because auditor choice is 
systematically related to auditees’ unobservable characteristics, such as the quality of internal controls and 
insider knowledge of the riskiness of future cash flows.  As noted by Ireland and Lennox (2001, p. 75), 
‘although the standard OLS audit fee models control for observable differences, characteristics that are not 
observable to the academic researcher may affect both fees and auditor choice and thereby cause bias.’  In 
                                                      
4  This choice ensures that the errors play no role as the means of the predicted errors are zero. 
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this context, Titman and Trueman (1986) and Datar et al. (1991) each develop models predicting that 
auditor quality is a function of firm-specific risk, of which firm insiders are better informed than outsiders.  
However, both models make competing predictions about the nature of the relationship between firm-
specific risk and auditor quality.  In particular, Datar et al. (1991) predict that entrepreneurs of risky firms 
choose higher quality auditors, whereas Titman and Trueman (1986) predict the opposite. 
 Selection bias arises if the unobservable characteristics of big 4 and non-big 4 auditees are 
systematically different from each other.  Suppose for example eNON and eBIG4 are drawn from the same 
distribution but that the big 4 auditees only have positive errors while the non-big 4 auditees only have 
negative ones.5  Then E(eBIG4)>0>E(eNON).  This effect can be modelled by writing the errors as 
eBIG4=E(eBIG4)+e and eNON=E(eNON)+e where e is pure random error uncorrelated with auditor choice and 
the regressors.  Estimating audit fee equations with standard single-stage OLS omits the conditional means 
(by assuming E(eBIG4)=E(eNON)=0) and leads to inconsistent estimates if these terms are correlated with the 
regressors.  In contrast the Heckman two-step procedure provides an estimate of the mean of the 
conditional error known as the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) or the selection term l that can be added to the 
regressors.  The selection term is estimated by modelling the auditor choice process via a simple probit 
selection model (step one), where each company has an unobserved propensity (D*) to choose a big 4 
auditor.  D* is a linear function of M regressors (Zm m=1,.., M) and other unobservable characteristics 
(eSEL).  The model is thus: 
          D*=d+SmdmZm+eSEL   Auditor choice equation  6. 
  ln FBIG4=a+b+SkbkX kBIG4 + e BIG4 For big 4 auditees  7. 
  ln FNON=a+SkakXkNON + eNON   For non big 4 auditees  8. 
If D*>0, D=1 and we observe ln F= ln FBIG4.  Otherwise D*£0, D=0 and ln F= ln FNON.  The model is 
completed by assuming that the errors of the selection equation and fee equations are jointly normal with 
                                                      
5 For example, if the positive error measures the unobserved value to the auditee of appointing a big 4 auditor, then 
big 4 auditees will value big 4 auditors more than non big 4 ones and therefore pay higher audit fees. 
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zero means, constant variances and covariances: E(eSELeNON)=sSNON and E(eSELeBIG4)=sSBIG4.  It is the 
implied correlation between the unobservable factors determining respectively the choice of auditor type 
and audit fees6 that enables the estimation of this model.   
 The Heckman two-step method for this model is based on the following equations:  
  ln FBIG4=a+b+SkbkX kBIG4 + sSBIG4l BIG4 +u For big 4 auditees  9. 
  ln FNON=a+SkakX kNONk - sSNONlNON +u  For non-big 4 auditees              10. 
where  4
( )
( )
m m m
BIG
m m m
Z
Z
f d
l
d
S
=
F S
 and  
( )
( )
m m m
NON
m m m
Z
Z
f d
l
d
-S
=
F -S
    11. 
and where f is the normal density function and F the normal distribution function.    The probit auditor 
choice model yields estimates of the selection terms l BIG4 and l NON which are included in the audit fee 
equations in the second step.  OLS applied to the augmented equations (i.e. including l BIG4 and l NON) 
yields consistent coefficient estimates and standard hypothesis tests can be applied with modified 
formulae for the standard errors. 7  The selection and audit fees equations in the Heckman model can also 
be estimated by maximum likelihood (ML), which leads to more efficient estimates if the model is 
correctly specified.  ML estimates do, however, require the maximisation of a complex likelihood that 
may be more sensitive to model mis-specification than conventional estimates. Accordingly, we report 
both conventional Heckman estimates and maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) for our two step models. 
 Although the Heckman procedure has become increasingly popular in auditing research, (and 
indeed in other areas of accounting and finance – see, for example, Li and Prabhala, 2007), its robustness 
has been questioned under certain conditions.  For example, Giles (2003, p. 1299) notes ‘Heckman’s 
                                                      
6   For instance, companies more likely to employ big 4 auditors (i.e. have ‘large’ eSEL) given their observable 
characteristics (Z) are likely to value unobservable aspects of big 4 auditors’ services more highly (i.e. have ‘large’ 
eBIG4). 
7 The fees equation for non big 4 auditees is estimated with selection into non Big 4 (i.e. the dependent variable for 
the probit is ND=1 if the firm is a non big 4 auditee).  The coefficient of the selection term in this estimation is the 
covariance between the error in the selection equation determining whether ND=1 and eNON  i.e. an estimate of 
-sSNON.  All the results below for the non big 4 fees equation report estimates of sSNON. 
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sample selectivity correction methodology offers a way of improving on the estimates obtained with non-
random samples. While there is improvement in general in this regard, there are situations in which the 
correction for sample selectivity actually aggravates the problem.’  Potential collinearity between the 
selection term and the other regressors in the second stage equation can cause severe problems.  In 
addition some researchers identify the second stage equation via the non-linearity of the selection term 
only. However, recent econometric (particularly Monte Carlo) studies suggest that to adequately identify 
the model it should contain an instrument – that is a regressor which determines the choice of auditor but 
has no significant effect on determining audit fees (Little, 1985; Puhani, 2000). But collinearity may still 
cause problems when an instrument (also known as an exclusion or identifying variable) is employed, 
leading to unstable estimates (Stolzenberg and Relles, 1997; Leung and Yu, 2000; Li and Prabhala, 2005).  
Against this background, it is perhaps unsurprising that empirical results in auditing studies using the 
Heckman model have, to date, been mixed.  Ireland and Lennox (2002) and McMeeking et al. (2006) 
report that the large-auditor premium is higher when self selection is controlled for, whereas Chaney et al. 
(2004; 2005) find the opposite: i.e., firms that chose (then) big 5 auditors would have been charged more 
had they selected a non-big 5 auditor. 
In the absence of satisfactory instruments, the selection effect is only identified by extreme 
observations of the selection term l for example, those companies whose probability of choosing a big 4 
auditor is estimated to be close to 1 in the probit model. 8  These big 4 auditees (usually because of their 
large size and complexity) effectively have no surrogate non-big 4 counterfactuals – that is, there is no 
‘common support’ - the common support region being where big 4 clients have non-big 4 counterparts 
with similar characteristics. Following Black and Smith (2004), we therefore test in this paper the 
robustness of the Heckman results by re-estimating our models without the extreme observations of the 
selection term. 
                                                      
8  It should be noted that generally, the selection term is highly non-linear for large values of the standard normal 
variate. 
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This problem of producing adequate counterfactuals motivates matching methods as an alternative 
to the Heckman approach. Such methods are gaining in popularity in the social science literature (e.g. 
Bryson, 2002; Malo and Muna-Bullon, 2005; Diaz and Sudhanshu, 2006) and are based on matching the 
observable characteristics of members in the treatment group (i.e., big 4 auditees in our case) to members 
(counterfactuals) in the untreated group (non-big 4 auditees). Matching circumvents the requirement of 
linear functional form assumptions, the common support issue and exclusion restrictions (Bryson, 2002; 
Black and Smith, 2004) discussed above.  However, there are various matching estimators to choose from. 
In particular, there is an essential trade-off in respect of how closely variables are matched (especially 
continuous variables), together with the number of variables used for matching, and the sample size – 
often referred to as the ‘curse of dimensionality’ (Ho et al., 2007) – such that matching closely on more 
than a few variables can result in prohibitively small matched samples unsuitable for any meaningful 
analysis. 
 The important assumptions made with matching concern the issues of common support and 
conditional independence.9  The former assumption emphasises the need to compare like with like: if the 
big 4 premium is regarded as applicable to any auditee, then clients should be able to change their auditor 
and pay the corresponding counterfactual fees.  The focus of attention is thus on similar big 4 and non-big 
4 auditees and hence companies are excluded from the analysis where, based on their observable 
characteristics, they are very highly likely to employ either big 4 or non-big 4 auditors. 
        The conditional independence assumption requires that the value of audit fees is independent of 
auditor type given the values of some observable variables (Zº{Z1,..,ZM}).  More formally: 
   ln FBIG4, ln FNON^D|Z       12. 
It is thus assumed that any systematic effect of the choice of auditor (D) on audit fees can be 
completely explained in terms of some observable variables (Z).  In practice, Z is interpreted as the 
                                                      
9  A third assumption – stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) – is also made.  The SUTVA means that the 
use of big 4 auditors should not indirectly affect the non big 4 auditees. 
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determinants of the auditor choice decision. An implicit assumption is that the choice of auditor type does 
not affect the value of any Z thus affecting the choice of which variables to include in Z. 
The matching method technique used in the current paper and which has recently been applied in 
the applied econometrics literature (see e.g. Black and Smith, 2004; Simonsen and Skipper, 2006), but not 
to our knowledge in auditing research to date, is propensity score matching. This method relies on 
matching big 4 and non-big 4 auditees on the basis of the predicted probabilities (propensity scores) 
derived from a probit auditor choice model (in our case the first stage probit auditor selection model from 
the Heckman procedure). Consider the following semi-parametric matching model (with the selection 
equation repeated for later reference): 
          D*=d+SmdmZm+eSEL                  Selection equation  13. 
  ln FBIG4=m BIG4(Z)+ e BIG4      For big 4 auditees              14. 
  ln FNON=mNON(Z) + eNON                   For non big 4 auditees 15. 
If D*>0, D=1 and we observe ln F=ln FBIG4.  Otherwise D*£0, D=0 and ln F=ln FNON.  The audit fee 
equations have additive errors but may be nonlinear in the conditional mean values (m BIG4 and m NON).  
These means may depend on other regressors but the conditional mean independence assumption (CIA) 
means that the only relevant determinants are contained in (Z). 
To illustrate the matching approach, consider each big 4 auditee in turn and, where possible, 
identifying non big 4 auditees with characteristics similar enough to those of the big 4 auditees to be 
regarded as the same.  This can usually only be achieved when the original explanatory variables are 
employed for a small subset of big 4 auditees, because some big 4 clients lie outside the common support 
region, that is, there is no non-big 4 auditee sufficiently close to make an effective match.  Let M be the 
set of NM matched pairs of firms.  The estimated treatment effect for each matched big 4 auditee is defined 
as: 
  D(Zi)= ln FBIG4(Zi) - ln FNON (Zi)   iÎM                                          16. 
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The estimated big 4 premium (D), or the treatment effect, is the sample mean of these differences across 
all values of Z in M or the difference in the sample means. Hence: 
1 1
ln ( ) ln ( )BIG4 NONi i
M M
F F
N NM MÎ Î
é ù é ù
D = -ê ú ê ú
ë û ë û
å åi iZ Z    17. 
  4ln lnBIG M NONMF FD = -       18. 
where the subscript M indicates that the mean is for companies in the matched sample. 
An important advantage of the propensity score approach is that matching is conducted with 
reference to only one variable (the propensity score, which varies between zero and one) rather than on a 
large number of individual (often continuous) explanatory variables, which is typically impractical.  The 
propensity score is: 
p(Z)ºPr(D=1|Z)      19. 
We estimate the selection equation using a parametric estimator (in our case a probit model) and 
find the predicted probabilities (propensity scores) of choosing a big 4 auditor for all the firms in our 
samples.  We then closely match each big 4 auditee to a non big 4 auditee that has a very similar 
propensity score.  The estimated premium for each matched big 4 auditee is defined as: 
  D(Zi)= ln FBIG4(p(Zi)) - ln FNON(p(Zi))    iÎM  20. 
where M is the set of NM matched pairs of firms.  The estimated big 4 premium (D) is the sample mean of 
these differences across all values of p(Z) in M, or the difference in the sample means: 
1 1
ln ( ( )) ln ( ( ))BIG4 NONi M i M
M M
F p F p
N NÎ Î
é ù é ù
D = -ê ú ê ú
ë û ë û
å åi iZ Z    21. 
As noted by Black and Smith (2004, p. 110), the logic underpinning this method is ‘that 
subgroups with values of X [explanatory variables] that imply the same probability of treatment can be 
combined because they will always appear in the treatment and (matched) comparison groups in the same 
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proportion.  As a result, any differences between subgroups with different X but the same propensity score 
balance out when constructing the estimates.’ An important limitation of matching approaches, however, 
is that they are, by their very nature unable to formally control for any unobserved auditee characteristics 
which may influence the variable of interest (audit fees).  Thus, as noted by Dehejia and Wahba (2002, p. 
153): ‘Intuitively, this assumes that, conditioning on observable covariates, we can take assignment to 
treatment to have been random and that, in particular, unobservables play no role in the treatment 
assignment; comparing two individuals with the same observable characteristics, one of whom was treated 
and one of whom was not is … like comparing those two individuals in a randomized experiment’.  While 
the Heckman approach solves this problem by allowing unobservable factors to influence auditor choice, 
there is a trade-off in practice due to the sensitivity to specification discussed above. 
 The second matching approach we take is an intermediate one which combines matching with the 
standard OLS regression used in the majority of prior studies. Following previous research that highlights 
the potential pitfalls of model sensitivity (Ho et al., 2007), initially we preprocess our data and then 
estimate the standard audit-fee model with a binary big-4 indicator variable.  Preprocessing involves 
matching big 4 and non-big 4 auditees only on key attributes (in the current study, being well-tested 
measures of auditee size, complexity and risk) thereby ensuring sufficient matched observations to 
conduct standard (in the current case OLS regression) techniques to control for any remaining 
confounding factors.  As stated by Ho et al. (2007, p. 3) this approach combines the merits of both non-
parametric matching with conventional parametric estimators: ‘In a sense our recommendations already 
constitute best practice since matching alone is not a method of estimation and always requires some 
technique to compute estimates … we simply point out that, except in the extraordinary case where 
matching is exact, parametric procedures have the potential to greatly improve causal inferences even after 
matching.’ 
 Given the importance of the large auditor premium to academic researchers and policy makers, we 
test for its presence using all the methods outlined above.  Firstly we employ the two-stage Heckman 
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estimator (including an exclusion variable) and, following Black and Smith (2004), we test for the 
robustness of the results by re-estimating them in respect of the common support region.  We follow this 
with both propensity score matching using predicted probabilities derived from the parameters of our 
auditor selection model and the semi-parametric matching procedures advanced by Ho et al. (2007).  
 
EMPIRICAL MODELS AND DATA 
Variables 
The variables used in our audit fee model (see Table 1) have been widely employed in prior research (e.g., 
Simunic, 1980; Pong and Whittington, 1994; Chan et al., 1994; Ezzamel et al. 1996; Chaney et al., 2004; 
McMeeking et al., 2006; Clatworthy and Peel, 2007). 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 Since corporate size (serving as a proxy for audit effort) has been found to be the key driver of 
external audit fees in previous research, we employ both total assets and turnover as size measures in our 
research.  Pong and Whittington (1994, p. 1075) note that audits have two broad dimensions: ‘an audit of 
transactions and verification of assets.  The former will be related to turnover and the latter to total assets.’  
Following the vast majority of previous studies, we specify the relationship between audit fees (lnAFEE) 
and the size measures for turnover (lnSAL) and total assets (lnTA) in natural logarithmic form to capture 
potential economies of scale in the audit.  In order to control for audit complexity, we include a variable 
labelled SQSUBS, defined as the square root of the number of subsidiaries (e.g., Francis and Simon, 
1987), and EXPSAL - the ratio of non-UK turnover to total turnover (e.g., Beatty, 1993; Chaney et al., 
2004), both of which we expect to be positively related to audit fees.   
 To capture auditee risk characteristics, we employ the ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
(TLTA) and the ratio of net profit before tax to total assets (RTA), which we expect to be positively and 
negatively related to audit fees, respectively (e.g., Chan et al., 1993 and Firth, 1997).  Following previous 
research (e.g. Palmrose, 1986; Chaney et al., 2004; Clatworthy and Peel, 2007) we employ three 
additional binary variables to capture incremental risk/complexity in the audit.  These are whether (coded 
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1) or not (coded 0) the audit client received a qualified audit report (QUALIF), reported exceptional 
and/or extraordinary items (EXITEM), disclosed a post-balance sheet event (PBAL) or a contingent 
liability (CONLIAB).  All these variables are expected to be positively related to audit fees (ibid.).10 
 Finally, we include binary variables for whether (coded 1) or not (coded 0) companies are audited 
by a big 4 auditor (BIG4), whether the audit client’s year end falls in December or March (BUSY) and 
whether the company is located in London (LOND).  The latter two variables are expected to be positively 
related to audit fees in that companies audited during the ‘busy’ period may be charged higher fees  and 
companies located in London are expected to pay higher audit fees reflecting cost of living differentials 
(Chaney et al., 2004; Clatworthy and Peel, 2007). 
 Other than in respect of corporate size and complexity, the literature motivating the choice of 
variables in the auditor selection model is less developed and is usually based on including a sub-group of 
variables from the audit fee equation in the selection model (Chaney et al., 2004; 2005; Hamilton et al., 
2005, though cf. Ireland and Lennox, 2002) and/or relying on identifying the selection model via non-
linearity only.  As discussed above, these approaches are problematic, since neither a subset of the 
regressors from the fees equation nor the non-linearity may be adequate to identify the effects of 
selectivity bias.   
If one assumes that firms choose auditor type by comparing their predicted costs (fees), the choice 
of auditor type depends on all the factors affecting the fees charged by either type of auditor.  Thus all 
regressors in the fees equations enter the auditor choice model.  While it is important to include an 
identification variable that is significantly associated with auditor choice (in the probit model), but not 
with audit fees (in the fees equation), such identification variables are extremely hard to obtain in practice 
(see e.g. Puhani, 2000). The present study is no exception. We attempted several plausible instruments11 
                                                      
10 Because company records on FAME only indicate whether or not either of these events occurred, we are unable to 
refine PBAL or CONLIAB to take account of the types of events or the nature of liabilities.  Hence, we assess the 
average impact of these events.  We also note that we are unable to ascertain the nature of the qualification from 
FAME and hence through QUALIF, we again measure the average impact of a qualified audit report. 
11  These included changes in sales, change in equity, change in total assets and various transformations. 
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and found only one – the change in the absolute value of total assets (CHTA) between the current and 
preceding year – which was statistically significant (and with the expected sign) in the probit selection 
model, but statistically insignificant when included in the OLS audit fee models.12  Furthermore it is not 
formally a ‘weak’ instrument since it has an F-statistic of 11.21 for the null that it is insignificant in the 
regression of auditor type (D) on all the regressors.  This exceeds the critical value of 8.96 for the validity 
a single instrument given by Stock et al. (2002) and the informal value of 10 that is widely used and 
advocated by Stock and Watson (2003 p.350). 
 Our motivation for including CHTA in the selection model is that companies which are involved 
in relatively large investments/acquisition or divestments/sale of assets, may require the expertise of a big 
4 auditor due to the additional complexity of the audit.  In addition, Keasey and Watson (1994) note that 
the absolute change in firm size (total assets) may from an agency perspective, act as a proxy for 
contractual changes at the firm level, which could give rise to a change in the demand for auditing 
services.  Hence, large auditors may be associated with reducing agency costs (e.g., Ireland and Lennox, 
2002), in companies with large asset variations. Although it has desirable theoretical qualities, it is also 
employed  for pragmatic reasons, since it fulfils its main purpose of properly identifying the audit fee 
equations. 
 Following previous studies (e.g., Chaney et al., 2004; Hamilton et al.,, 2005), we expect the 
variables reflecting auditee size and complexity to be positively associated with the choice of a big 4 
auditor in the probit model, in consequence of their hypothesised capacity to provide more efficient audits 
and to reduce agency costs (ibid.).  In line with prior research (e.g. Ireland and Lennox, 2002; Chaney et 
al., 2004; 2005), we also expect our auditee risk variables to be positively associated with the selection of 
a big 4 auditor.  As noted by Hamilton et al. (2005, p. 9), ‘The greater the client’s risk, the higher the 
propensity for the impairment of agency relationships.  To mitigate the associated agency costs, higher 
quality auditors, surrogated by big 4, are more likely to be selected to signal the credibility of reporting.’  
                                                      
12  The t-values on CHTA when included in models 1, 2 and 3 were, respectively: 0.05, 1.32 and 0.18. 
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Furthermore, Datar et al. (1991) predict, and Copley and Douthett (2002) find, a positive relationship 
between auditee risk and the appointment of a higher quality auditor. 
 With regard to the final two variables (LOND and BUSY), we have no strong priors on their 
influence on auditor choice, other than that the univariate results of extant studies (as in the current study) 
have consistently reported (for both private and quoted audit clients) that a significantly higher proportion 
of big 4 auditors conduct their audits during the busy period – but that a significantly higher proportion of 
non-big 4 auditors are appointed to companies located in London (e.g., Ireland and Lennox, 2002; Chaney 
et al., 2004). 
 
Data 
The source of our data in the Bureau Van Dijk FAME DVD-ROM UK database.  Financial 
(annual accounts data) and non-financial data (e.g., company location, auditor and audit qualification) are 
available as individual records for each company on the database.  Companies were selected for inclusion 
in the study if they met the following criteria: their primary activities (according to FAME primary 
Standard Industrial Classification codes) were outside the financial sector; they were private limited 
companies; they were ‘live’ companies (i.e. had not ceased trading, failed or entered into voluntary 
liquidation); their audited accounts were available on FAME; they had full data available, including total 
assets and sales (minimum £1000), audit fee (minimum £100), and a disclosed profit/loss figure.  In order 
to avoid the potential confounding influences of including both holding companies and their subsidiaries 
in the regression model (e.g., Ezzamel et al., 1996; Peel and Roberts, 2003), our sample only includes 
independent companies (i.e., those not held as a subsidiary of another company).  In line with previous 
studies (e.g., Firth, 1997), financial companies were excluded due to the different composition of their 
financial statements and only live companies were selected to avoid the confounding influence of 
including non-live auditees.  In addition, and in line with previous research, 11 companies with joint 
auditors (none of which were big 4 auditors) were excluded from the analysis to comply with the binary 
nature of the probit model.  Following these restrictions, we obtained financial and numerical data, 
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together with non-financial data, for 36,674 private companies from FAME for the latest financial 
statements available (predominantly for the calendar year 2003).   
 It is important to note (for it has implications for the sample size and for data accuracy) that the 
FAME default setting for downloading data is £000s, with data being rounded to the nearest £1000; for 
example an audit fee of £1550 would be rounded to £2000 and one of £400 to zero (i.e. a missing value.) 
Data can, however, be downloaded (as in the current study) in £ and hence neither data accuracy nor 
observations are lost using this option.13 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis are presented in Table 2.  The average 
audit fee (AFEE) for the whole sample (n = 36,674) amounted to £7.80k, with companies having mean 
sales (SAL) and total assets (TA) of £7.97m and £5.86m respectively – and with companies ranging from 
a minimum of £1k to a maximum of £4,979m for sales and £1k to £5,234m for total assets.  Table 2 also 
shows that, other than in respect of audit qualifications (QUALIF), all the variables differ significantly (in 
respect of means, medians and proportions) between the big 4 (n = 3,038) and the non-big 4 (n = 33,636) 
sub samples.  In particular, and consistent with prior expectations, we note that big 4 clients are 
significantly larger (as measured by both SAL and TA), have more subsidiaries (SUBS), a higher 
proportion of foreign to total sales (EXPSAL) and are more likely to report post balance sheet events 
(PBAL), contingent liabilities (CONLIAB) and exceptional items (EXITEM).  In addition, on average, big 
4 clients exhibit lower profitability (RTA) but higher gearing (TLTA), are less likely to be located in 
London (LOND), but more likely to be audited during the busy period (BUSY), and are associated with a 
significantly higher absolute change in the value of total assets (CHTA). 
 Because of the large number of small auditees represented in the non-big 4 sample, the mean and 
median values of the size variables for big 4 auditors are substantially larger (mean sales and total assets 
                                                      
13 The sampling consequences of this are not trivial since it captures a large number of smaller firms.  For instance, 
Chaney et al. (2004), who download data in £000 and deleted many small companies due to imprecision, report big 4 
concentration of 50% compared to 8% in our sample; furthermore, the mean total assets for companies in their 
sample is £24.28 million whereas the corresponding figure in our study is £5.86 million.  
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of £39.41m and £35.62m) than for the non-big 4 auditors (mean sales and total assets of £5.13m and 
£3.17m).   
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We commence our analysis with standard single-stage OLS regression under the assumption of no 
selection bias.  We then report our comparative analysis employing the two-step Heckman procedure, 
together with associated robustness tests.  Finally, we present the results of the matching procedures. 
 
Single stage results 
Model 1 in Table 3 shows that the OLS estimates for the standard pooled audit fee specification, 
which is employed in the vast majority of previous studies.  All explanatory variables exhibit their 
expected signs and, other than the busy period variable (BUSY), which is statistically significant at the 
0.10 level (p=0.079) all are highly significant (p<0.0001 in all cases).  In particular, we note that the BIG4 
coefficient (0.270) implies14 that, on average, the audit fees of a non-big 4 auditee would increase by 31% 
if it were to employ a big 4 auditor. Also noteworthy is that the model explains a relatively high 
proportion (R2 of 78%) of the variation in the audit fees of UK private companies, comparing favourably 
with that (57%) reported by Chaney et al., (2004) for their sample of UK private firms. 
 Models 2 and 3 in Table 3 report OLS estimates for audit fee equations for the big 4 and non-big 4 
auditee samples respectively.  Model 1 assumes the same specification for big 4 and non-big 4 auditees.  
However, in common with Chaney et al. (2004) a joint F-test rejected the null hypothesis (F = 13.43; 
p=0.000) that the coefficients in the two models (2 and 3) were the same, implying that the fee setting 
process differs between the two auditor types.  The focus of our empirical analysis is therefore models 2 
and 3 in Table 3 (i.e., those which allow the slope coefficients of the explanatory variables to differ for big 
4 and non-big 4 auditees). 
Insert Table 3 about here 
                                                      
14 We use the standard transformation ex – 1 (where x = the coefficient/mean log difference) to compute percentages 
reported in the paper. 
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 Table 3 shows that for the non-big 4 specification (model 3) all the explanatory variables exhibit 
their expected signs and, other than for BUSY which loses statistical significance (p = 0.131), all variables 
are highly significant (p < 0.0001 in all cases).  For the big 4 specification (model 3) in addition to BUSY, 
the coefficient sign on the gearing variable (TLTA) is negative, but statistically insignificant – a finding in 
common with Chaney et al. (2004) for their big 4 equation; furthermore, the intercept in model 2 is larger 
than that in model 3 – a result also found by Chaney et al. (2004), which they attribute to big 4 auditors 
recovering their higher expenditure on training and facilities. 
 To examine the premium in more detail, we use the OB decomposition (discussed above) on our 
estimates for models 2 and 3.  Firstly, the OB decomposition based on measuring the premium using the 
characteristics of the big 4 auditees is: 
4 4 4
1 1
ln ln      ( )        ( )
K K
BIG NON k BIG k NONk k k BIG k
k k
F F a X X b b a X
= =
- = - + + -å å   22. 
Actual difference   = Explained by characteristics + big 4 premium 
 9.4364-7.9099     =       9.1809-7.9099                 +     9.4364-9.1809   23. 
    1.5265              =            1.2709                           +        0.2556 
      (263.6)                                     (21.87) 
 
Greene (2003, p.54) provides the formulae for the estimated standard errors of each term in the 
decomposition and we report the t-values in parentheses.  There is a large and significant (p = 0.000) 
difference in the means of the audit fees paid by companies audited by big 4 and non big 4 auditors 
(1.5265) using parameters from models 2 and 3.  Most of this is accounted for by differences in their 
respective client characteristics (1.2709 or 83%).  Nonetheless there is, on average, a significant (p = 
0.000) big 4 premium of 0.2556, indicating a big 4 mark-up of 29.1%, which is close to that (31.0%) 
estimated in the pooled OLS equation (Model 1).  On average, big 4 auditees paid audit fees of £12,537 
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(e9.4364), but would have paid £9,710 if they were charged according to the non-big 4 parameters (model 3) 
- a reduction of 23%.15   
 Hence, the results, based on conventional single-stage OLS estimates, reported in Models 2 and 3 
are consistent with the presence of a big 4 audit premium (at least in the absence of potential selectivity 
bias).  The next section presents our two-stage results where we analyse the extent to which the findings in 
this section are affected by selection bias. 
 
Heckman Two-Step Regressions 
Table 3 shows the two-step results with maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) and standard 
Heckman two-step estimates.  Model 4a (4b) reports the probit selection model estimates for the choice of 
a big 4 auditor while models 5a (5b) and 6a (6b) report the MLE (standard Heckman) audit fee regression 
estimates for the big 4 and non big 4 auditees, including the additional parameter l (for the IMR estimated 
from the coefficients in model 4) to control for selection bias. 
 The probit selection models 4a and 4b show that other than for the variables CONLIAB and 
lnSAL, all the explanatory variables and significantly associated with auditor choice.  In particular, the 
coefficient on the identifying variable (CHTA) exhibits its expected sign and is highly statistically 
significant (p = 0.000).16  Also consistent with prior expectations and previous research, Model 4 shows 
that larger (lnTA) more complex (SQSUBS; EXPSAL) and higher risk (RTA; TLTA) companies are more 
likely to appoint a big 4 auditor.  Companies receiving audit qualifications (QUALIF) are more likely to 
employ a non-big 4 auditor in contrast to those reporting a post-balance sheet event (PBAL) and auditees 
based in London, which are less likely to select a big 4 auditor, but are more likely to do so if their 
account year ends fall in the busy period (BUSY).  The Wald chi-squared statistic of 2668.40 (p < 0.0001) 
                                                      
15 The results for non-big 4 clients also implied a statistically significant premium (at p = 0.000) of 31%. 
16 The statistical insignificance of lnSAL in the auditor choice equation is not related to collinearity with CHTA.  
When CHTA was removed from Model 4, lnSAL remained statistically insignificant.  In addition, when lnSAL was 
removed from Model 4, CHTA remained positive and statistically significant. 
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for Model 4b indicates the selection equation is well determined; the McFadden’s R2 is 0.204 the model 
correctly classifies (using a cut-off point of 0.083)17 77.52% and 70.81% of the big 4 and non-big 4 
auditees respectively, with an overall correct classification rate of 71.37%. 
 The audit fee equations exhibit the same pattern of significance levels as the single stage estimates 
in Models 2 and 3.  Informally the estimates appear to be similar in magnitude except for the constant in 
the big 4 equation, which has a smaller value for the MLE in Model 5a (1.967 compared with 2.638).  Of 
more import is the positive l coefficient, which is statistically significant at the 5% level in the non-big 4 
(p = 0.000) model and in the big 4 model (p = 0.036), implying significant evidence of selection bias.  The 
positive MLE estimate of 0.142 (Model 5a) for the covariance sSBIG and the negative one of -0.199 (Model 
6a) for sSNON imply that an increase in the value for the unobservable error in the auditor selection 
equation (eSEL) is associated with an increase in the value of unobservable component of big 4 fees (eBIG4) 
and a decrease in the value of unobservable component of non big 4 fees (eNON), though the former 
estimate is insignificant at the 0.05 level. 
To illustrate this, consider two firms with identical observable characteristics (Z) which choose 
different types of auditor.  The big 4 auditee has a larger unobservable error in the auditor selection 
equation (i.e., eSEL is smaller).  In this sense, big 4 auditors will have larger values of eSEL but the estimated 
covariances indicate that larger values of these errors are associated with larger values of eBIG and smaller 
values of eNON.  These estimates imply that big 4 auditees will tend to pay higher fees in the big 4 fees 
equation and lower fees in the non-big 4 equations because of their unobserved characteristics.  The 
converse also applies: non big 4 auditees will tend to pay lower fees according to the big 4 fees equation 
                                                      
17 Note that this cut-off point (0.083) is the mean value of both the binary dependent variable and the predicted 
probabilities derived from the probit model.  It reflects the prior probability (that is with a constant only probit 
model) of the selection of a big 4 auditor.  It is an equivalent cut-off point (0.5) to that used in many studies where 
equal (or approximately equal) sub-samples are employed in logit/probit models.  Note also that the McFaddens R2 
gives cognisance to the foregoing in that it is calculated as: unity minus log likelihood at convergence (full probit 
model) divided by log likelihood at zero (constant only probit model). 
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and higher fees according to the non big 4 equation because of their unobserved characteristics.  Thus the 
effect of the unobservables is to cause private companies to choose the most expensive auditor.   
These results are not consistent with cost minimisation and directly contradict the results of 
Chaney et al. (2004) who report negative estimates of sSBIG (-0.167) and positive estimates of sSNON 
(0.508).  Of course, the fees represent willingness to pay for the particular services provided by each type 
of auditor as well as cost, so the results may merely indicate that big 4 auditees are willing to pay more for 
the services of big 4 and less to other auditors.  Non big 4 auditees value each type of auditor differently 
from big 4 auditees; not only are they willing to pay more for the services of non big 4 auditors but they 
also place a lower value on the services of a big 4 auditor.   
Although it is prima facie puzzling why firms do not change auditors, it is not implausible that 
companies choose more expensive auditors from both big 4 and non big 4 categories.  As discussed 
earlier, there are numerous explanations in the auditing literature for firms paying higher fees for the 
appointment of big 4 auditors.  Similarly, recent survey-based research by Marriott et al. (2007) finds that 
very small UK companies prefer non-big 4 auditors due to the more personal services and stronger 
relationships offered by smaller auditors, especially since the latter are often involved in the provision of 
other accounting services such as tax advice.  Our MLE results in Table 3 imply that all of the difference 
in fees is due to unobservable auditee characteristics, making it difficult to acquire precise information 
about the potential cost savings and discouraging mobility.  Moreover, each type of auditor can exploit the 
lack of mobility by raising fees so the positive selection effects may reflect in part monopoly rents for 
both types of auditor.  A further possibility is that the potential gains involved in switching auditor may 
not justify the costs involved: for instance, the median fees paid by a big 4 auditee were £13,000 while the 
median sales were over £8m.  
The results in Models 5a and 5b using the Heckman two-step estimator are somewhat perplexing 
since they exaggerate the MLE results.  Although the coefficients on the l are significant at the 0.000 
level for both equations, they are implausibly large (in absolute terms) at 0.446 for the big 4 and -0.509 for 
the non-big 4 auditees.  Thus the selection coefficient for the big 4 equation more than doubles (compared 
 26  
to the MLE), leading to huge changes in the composition of the conditional mean for big 4 auditees. 
Further indications of model instability are provided by the insignificance of the intercept and QUALIF in 
the big 4 Heckman model (5b).  Given these results and the reservations in the literature concerning the 
robustness of this technique in prior research, we subject this result to further scrutiny by assessing its 
sensitivity to changes in specification. 
To calculate the impact of selection bias on the big 4 premium by isolating its observable and 
unobservable effects, we concentrate on the big 4 premium measured at the sample means of the big 4 
auditees, i.e., the average effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT). The predicted audit fees paid by a 
big 4 client at the sample means are: 
 4 4 4, 4ln BIG k k kBIG SBIG BIG BIGF a b b X g l= + + S +   For big 4 clients (actual) 24. 
 4 4, 4ln NON k k kBIG SNON BIG BIGF a a X g l= + S +   For big 4 clients (counterfactual) 25. 
The counterfactual equation (27) shows the predicted audit fees of a typical big 4 client if they were paid 
according to the non-big 4 equation.  Since the same regressor means are used to compute predicted audit 
fees, we have removed any potential differences due to the different characteristics (the explained 
differences) of the big 4 and non-big 4 auditees, with any remaining difference amounting to the big 4 
premium (the unexplained differences).  
The two components of predicted audit fees estimate the separate effects of the observable 
regressors and the unobservables.  For example, the decomposition for the counterfactual audit fees 
( ln NONF ) comprises the predicted fees paid to a non big 4 auditor by any firm with the same mean 
observable characteristics ( 4k k kBIGa a X+ S ) plus the selection effect ( 4, 4SNON BIG BIGg l ) showing the 
predicted effect of unobservable characteristics.  The first term is the unconditional mean showing the 
predicted audit fees if the allocation of clients to big 4 and non-big 4 auditors were random.18  The 
predicted fees (lnF) incorporate the selection terms and are therefore referred to as the conditional 
                                                      
18  Note that with random selection, there would be no selection effect. 
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means.19  Hence, the predicted fee equations have the form: conditional mean = unconditional mean + 
selection effect.   
The estimates for models 5a and 6a in Table 3 are: 
 4 4 4, 4ln BIG k k kBIG SBIG BIG BIGF a b b X g l= + + S +   For big 4 clients (actual) 26. 
 9.4364   =       9.2268      +   0.2096      
And: 
 4 4, 4ln NON k k kBIG SNON BIG BIGF a a X g l= + S +  For big 4 clients (counterfactual)  27. 
 8.8230    =       9.1174     -   0.2944    
 The typical big 4 auditee actually paid fees in natural log form of 9.4364 (£12,537).  By contrast it 
would have paid predicted fees as a non big 4 auditee of 8.8230 in natural log form (£6,789) giving a very 
large big 4 premium of 0.6134 or 85%.  Our results suggest that on average, big 4 auditees would have 
paid 9.2268 in natural log terms (£10,166) for the services of a big 4 auditor and 9.1174 (£9,113) for a 
non-big 4 auditor, if their unobservable characteristics were ignored.  However, in consequence of the big 
4 auditees’ unobservable characteristics, an additional 0.2096 in log terms is paid for the services of a big 
4 auditor, and 0.2944 less for the services of a non big 4 auditor (note that since the equations are 
estimated in natural log terms, they do not give a simple linear decomposition in pounds). 
 The conditional fee of £12,537 is obtained by multiplying the unconditional fee of £10,166 by the 
MLE selection effect 1.23 (e0.2096).  The effect of unobservables is to increase the unconditional big 4 fees 
in pounds by 23%.  Similarly the effect of unobservables is to decrease the non big 4 fees in pounds by 
26% (e-0.2944=0.74).  Big 4 auditees choose the more expensive auditors based on observed information.  
The effect of the unobservables drives the big 4 fees further above those of the smaller auditors. 
The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is the difference in the conditional means of the 
audit fees paid by big 4 and non-big 4 auditees and represents the difference in fees that can only be 
                                                      
19  They are conditional in the sense that they are estimates of the expected audit fees conditional on the firm 
employing either a big 4 or a non-big 4 auditor. 
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achieved by big 4 auditees. By contrast, the average treatment effect (ATE) shows the difference in fees 
available to any auditee. The relationship between the treatment effects is shown below: 
4, 4 , 4 4 4, 4 4, 4ln ln ( )BIG BIG NON BIG k k k kBIG SBIG BIG BIG SNON BIG BIGF F b b a X g gl l- = + S - + -  28. 
                    (ATT)          =      (ATE)   +     Estimate[E(eBIG4|D=1)- E(eNON|D=1)] 
   Change in conditional means = change in unconditional means  +  change in unobservable effect 
     9.4364-8.8230   =    9.2268-9.1174    +   0.2096+0.2944  
    0.6134    =    0.1094   +          0.504  
The big 4 premium paid by big 4 auditees or ATT is 0.6134 (85%).  The typical big 4 auditee paid 
0.1094 (12%) more in fees based on their observable characteristics.  This ATE is generally available in 
that any firm with the same characteristics could achieve these savings by switching auditor type.  
However the peculiar unobservable characteristics of big 4 auditees mean that they would pay 0.504 more 
in natural log terms for the services of a big 4 auditor, whereas the unobserved characteristics of non big 4 
auditees means they would not be willing to pay this premium.  Since the selection effects are individually 
significant, they should be included in the model.  Although the ATE is rather large, it is not significantly 
different from zero (t=0.93 [p = 0.17].  By contrast the large selection effect is highly significant (t=4.20; 
p = 0.00).   
According to our two-step results, therefore, firms with similar observable characteristics would 
pay higher fees if they used a big 4 auditor, but the difference is insignificant.  However, auditees differ 
greatly in their unobserved characteristics and these differences help to generate the big 4 premium.  Our 
data do not enable us to identify whether the unobserved differences arise because the audits and resulting 
costs differ in some unobserved fashion or because different firms place different values on the products 
provided by both types of auditors.  We emphasise, however, that our results contrast sharply with those 
of Chaney et al. (2004), who report that it is the unobservable factors which make it cheaper for big 4 
auditees to opt for big 4 auditors, rather than non-big 4 ones. 
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To explore these findings in greater detail, Table 4 summarises our results and because of reports 
in prior literature of multicollinearity in the two-step model, the final column reports the R2 from a 
regression of the sample selection term (l) on the remaining regressors in the audit fee equations (Table 4, 
specification a).  These are 0.986 and 0.854 for the big 4 and non-big 4 equations respectively, suggesting 
that even after including an identifying variable (CHTA) multicollinearity may still be a problem.  Table 4 
therefore also examines the consequences of moderate perturbations in the specification of the two-step 
model.  We estimate a model without CHTA, similar to that reported in prior research, and also exclude 
lnSAL from the model.  The latter has been argued to capture an important aspect of the audit (e.g., Pong 
and Whittington, 1994) and has been found significant in many empirical studies; however, it was not 
included in the model reported by Chaney et al. (2004). 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Specifications a, c and e use MLE while specifications b, d and f follow previous studies and 
estimate the models using the standard Heckman two-sep procedure. The Heckman two-step results in 
Table 4 show that the typical big 4 auditee actually paid fees (in natural log terms) of 9.4364 (£12,537).  
By contrast it would have paid predicted fees as a non big 4 auditee of 8.2635 (£3,880) estimating the big 
4 premium at 1.1729 or 223%.  Big 4 auditees would have paid (in natural log terms) 8.7761 (£6,478) for 
the services of a big 4 auditor and 9.0180 (£8,250) for a non-big 4 auditor, if their unobservable 
characteristics were ignored.  However, in consequence of the big 4 auditees’ unobservable 
characteristics, an additional 0.6603 in natural log terms is paid for the services of a big 4 auditor, and 
0.7545 less for the services of a non big 4 auditor.  The effect of unobservables is to increase the big 4 fees 
in pounds by 94% (e0.6603=1.94).  According to these results, big 4 auditees choose the cheaper auditor 
based on observed information, but the most expensive when unobservable characteristics are taken into 
account. 
To examine the role of the identifying variable, specifications c and d show the impact of 
excluding CHTA from the probit model.  In this instance, changes in the MLE estimates are relatively 
minor, with the premium paid by the big 4 increasing moderately from 0.6134 (85%) to 0.6239 (87%).  
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The difference in unconditional means (ATE) in the Heckman model, however, increases almost fivefold 
to -1.155 and is now statistically significant (p < 0.01), though this is more than offset by the estimated 
impact of the unobservable selection difference (2.4845).  Comparing specifications therefore suggests the 
Heckman results are highly sensitive to model specification using the standard approach, though this is 
apparently less problematic using ML. 
Since it is inadvisable to rely on non-linearity for identification, we exclude sales (lnSAL) and 
contigent liabilities (CONLIAB) since they are both insignificant in the big 4 selection equation. 
However, excluding them from the selection equation produces little change in the estimates.  The 
selection estimate for the big 4 audit fee equation is now insignificant for both the MLE and Heckman 
results (although it remains highly significant and negative for the non big 4 equation). The main 
implication for the MLE results is that the ATE is larger and the selection effect is smaller and 
insignificant.  Once again the Heckman results are dramatically different from specification (b).  The ATE 
is now positive because of the large fall in the selection effect in the big 4 audit fee equation although the 
difference in the selection effects continues to be substantial and the premium (ATT) is very large. 
To summarise the findings in Table 4, if the Heckman model is correctly specified, the MLE 
appear to be the most efficient.  Significant selection effects are found in our preferred specification (a) 
though the results differ substantially from those reported by Chaney et al. (204). Omitting the instrument 
in specification (c) suggests that multicollinearity may not be a serious practical problem with MLE but 
prior research suggests that the difference in the estimates between MLE and Heckman may itself be a 
sign of fragility.  The Heckman estimates are therefore sensitive to the use of a satisfactory instrument: the 
lack of an instrument leads to an implausible change in the estimates.  The remaining specifications in 
Table 4 emphasise the role of size in defining these results.  The results are sensitive to the omission of 
sales but the unambiguous importance of sales in the fee equations and in prior theoretical and empirical 
research demonstrate that it should not be excluded.  Overall, therefore, although the Heckman Two Step 
procedure is the most popular method for dealing with selection bias in the accounting literature, the 
estimates it provides are potentially seriously unstable.  
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We also test the sensitivity of selection effects by changing the samples included in the selection 
models in Table 5.  Consider the case of a big 4 auditee that has a small probability on the basis of its 
observed characteristics of appointing a big 4 auditor.  The selection term in the big 4 equation (lBIG4) will 
be large and, perhaps counter-intuitively, this type of firm is not useful for identification because the 
selection term is mostly non-linear for small values for lBIG4.  Excluding firms with large values of lBIG4 
may actually reduce the potential influence of multicollinearity.  Similarly, a non big 4 auditee is behaving 
uncharacteristically if it chooses a non big 4 auditor when the probability of doing so is very low given its 
observed characteristics.  We therefore examine whether our selection results are sensitive to the exclusion 
of extreme values of the probability of regime choice (or equivalently in the value of the selection term). 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 Table 5 reports ML estimates of the coefficients of the sample selection terms as the sample 
changes.  Row 1 reports (for comparison) our previous estimates based on samples containing all big 4 
and all non big4 firms.  Rows 2 and 3 reports estimates where the sample of big 4 auditees excludes firms 
with a small probability of choosing a big 4 auditor on the basis of their observed characteristics ).  The 5 th 
percentile is the value for the probability (in this case 0.022) where 5% of big 4 auditees have a 
probability of choosing a big 4 auditor (Pr(D=1)) that is less than or equal to the 5th percentile (or 95% of 
big 4 auditees have Pr(D=1)>0.022).  The 10th percentile is the value for the probability (0.041) such that 
10% of big 4 auditees have Pr(D=1)£0.041 and 90% have Pr(D=1)>0.041.  The first results (rows 1-3) 
include all non big 4 auditees.  Rows 4 and 5 apply the previous logic to the samples of non big 4 auditees.  
Row 6 excludes big 4 auditees with the largest and smallest probabilities of choosing a big 4 auditor on 
the basis of their observed characteristics.  This appears reasonable on the grounds that they are atypical 
though these firms are likely to have values of the selection term lying in the range of values that is most 
useful for identification.  Rows 7 and 8 extend this logic, firstly, to the sample of non big 4 auditors and, 
secondly, to a narrower range of observations.   
 The results in rows 1 to 5 suggest that selection remains important.  Selection into the big 
4 regime is just significant with a coefficient in the range 0.06 to 0.14.  The estimates for selection into the 
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big 4 regime are not well defined when the firms with the largest probabilities are excluded.  This is 
perhaps unsurprising because the selection term becomes non-linear for large values of the probability and 
the sample size is no longer large enough to produce robust estimates.  In summary the selection into non 
big 4 auditor selection is well defined.  The selection coefficient for big 4 auditor appointments is, 
however, less robust when similar firms are included in the sample. Selection into the non big 4 group is 
always highly significant with a coefficient in the range -0.20 to -0.25.  The results for selection into the 
non-big 4 regime may be similar because the very large sample sizes outweigh the effect of the high 
correlation between the selection term and the regressors in the fees model.   
 
Matching Results 
 Because of the sensitivity of the Heckman model demonstrated above, this section reports the 
results of our matching analysis, which is not prone to the problems associated with model identification 
and specification. As discussed in more detail above, we employ two matching methods: propensity score 
matching, which is becoming increasingly popular in the social science and econometrics literature (e.g. 
Black and Smith, 2004; Simonsen and Skipper, 2006) and pre-process matching, as proposed by Ho et al. 
(2007). 
 
Propensity Score Matching 
As discussed above, recent developments in the statistics and econometrics literature have 
suggested propensity score matching as an additional or alternative approach to two-step Heckman 
procedures.  Starting with the seminal paper of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), propensity score matching 
has received considerable attention in research where selection issues are potentially problematic.  The 
‘curse of dimensionality’, which makes matching increasingly difficult as additional dimensions 
(variables) are added to match on, is avoided, since big 4 auditees are matched with non-big 4 auditees on 
the basis of the predicted probabilities from a probit model where the dependent variable is the binary 
auditor choice outcome.  Hence, in our study, big 4 auditees are matched to non-big 4 auditees on the 
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basis of the predicted probability of employing a big 4 auditor – with the propensity scores (predicted 
probabilities) being derived from the probit selection equation (Model 4, Table 3), which includes all the 
explanatory variables listed in Table 1.20 
 The commonest propensity score matching method is nearest neighbour matching with or without 
calliper matching – where the calliper method imposes a maximum difference between the propensity 
score of the nearest neighbour matched observations.  When employing this method, one faces a choice of 
whether to use replacement observations in the non-big 4 (non-treated) sample for matching with the big 4 
(treated) sample.  This can be important in the nearest neighbour (without calliper) approach, since very 
large big 4 clients may have a limited number of counterparts in the non-big 4 sample; hence, excluding 
replacement can result in large differences in propensity scores between the matched observations.   
Insert Table 6 about here 
 Table 6 therefore reports a number of matching approaches to illustrate the robustness of our 
results.  It shows that the big 4 premium (the difference in the means of lnAFEE for the big 4 and non-big 
4 sub-samples) is statistically significant at p<0.01 under each type of matching, ranging from 0.2531 
(28.8%) with a calliper of 0.001 (column 4) to 0.3082 (36.1%) under the nearest neighbour method with 
no replacement in column 3.  Moreover, as the statistics in column 5 demonstrate, even when big 4 and 
non-big 4 companies are very closely matched (with a maximum absolute difference21 in propensity scores 
of only 0.0001), the premium (0.2613 or 29.9%) remains robust and is within the range of premiums 
reported in our previous empirical analysis.22  The analysis in Table 6 is based on differences in the 
natural log of audit fee to facilitate comparison with our previous findings; however, we also conducted 
                                                      
20 The conditional mean independence assumption (CIA) is that the choice of regime (big 4 auditee or non-big 4 
auditee) is not dependent on the regime once the matching variables (Z) are taken into account.  This means in 
practice that the values of Z should not depend on the type of regime. We therefore use all the regressors in the fees 
equation as matching instruments (Z) and make the reasonable assumption that all the measured characteristics are 
pre-determined before the choice of auditor is made. 
21 Note the difference may be positive or negative, depending on whether the predicted probability of choosing a big 
4 auditor is larger or smaller than its matched counterpart and hence absolute differences are utilised. 
22 Further analysis (unreported, but available on request) revealed that the two samples were also very similar in 
respect of each of the characteristics (variables) in the probit equation.   
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the matching analysis using untransformed audit fees (rather than logged fees) and obtained similar 
results.   
 On the basis of matched samples that are very similar in terms of their observed characteristics, 
therefore, we find strong evidence of a big 4 premium of a similar magnitude to that found in prior 
auditing studies employing OLS.  Unlike those provided by the Heckman approach, these estimates are 
not sensitive to model specification. We acknowledge, however, that the additional robustness (and the 
fact that no assumptions are made about functional form in assessing the premium) comes at a cost: 
unobservable differences which may affect auditor choice are effectively assumed to be randomly 
distributed across the samples of big 4 and non-big 4 clients. 
 
Pre-processed OLS Results 
In applying the pre-processing method, we firstly partitioned our sample of 36,674 companies into 
portfolios (quantiles) on the basis of their actual size, risk and complexity 23 because these factors have 
been found to be particularly important determinants of both audit fees and auditor selection (e.g., see 
Simunic and Stein, 1996; Chaney et al., 2004). We created 40 equally sized portfolios based on sales 
(SAL), 40 equally sized portfolios based on return on total assets (RTA), 10 portfolios based on the 
number of subsidiaries (SUBS) and 11 portfolios based on the ratio of exports to sales (EXPSAL).  
Following this procedure, we split the above portfolio samples into companies audited by big 4 and non-
big 4 auditors and then matched the two samples so that each individual big 4 auditee had an individual 
non-big 4 counterpart with similar size, risk and complexity characteristics.   
 A difficulty with this process is that many big 4 clients have a number of non-big 4 counterparts 
of similar size, risk and complexity.  In order to circumvent this problem, we randomly selected (with 
                                                      
23 Note that the pre-processing matching method can be a more demanding process than propensity score matching 
since the former involves matching on the basis of actual values for the control variables simultaneously, rather than 
on the basis of a composite score; that is, each big four firm has a non-big 4 counterpart that has similar observed 
size and risk and complexity characteristics.  However, an advantage of propensity score matching is that, although 
it matches on the basis of only one variable, that variable (propensity score) is derived from information obtained 
from all the explanatory variables. 
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replacement) one match for each big 4/non-big 4 auditee.  Following this process, we combined the non-
big 4 auditee sample and the big 4 auditee sample and then re-estimated our standard regression equation 
(Model 1 in Table 3).  Using the random selection procedure, we repeated this process 2,000 times and 
obtained a distribution of BIG4 regression coefficients and their associated (White’s corrected) t-statistics.  
Each iteration involved samples of 1,828 big 4 auditees and 1,828 matched non-big 4 auditee counterparts 
(i.e., a total sample in each regression of 3656).  Additional analysis (unreported but available on request) 
showed that the two (big 4 and non-big 4) auditee samples were very closely matched on the four 
matching variables with, with on average, none of their means differing significantly at p < 0.05.24  
Insert Table 7 about here 
 Descriptive statistics from the 2,000 regressions for the BIG4 coefficient and White’s corrected t-
statistics are reported in Table 7.  The table shows that in every case, the BIG4 coefficient was statistically 
significant and positive, ranging from 0.2724 (26.7%) to 0.3091 (36.2%), with the mean and median 
taking the same value of 0.2724 (31.3%).  The distribution of t-statistics reveals that the BIG4 coefficient 
is consistently significant at p < 0.01.  It is also interesting to note that the range of coefficients implies a 
premium in the range of 27% - 36%, which is within the range (16-37%) found in prior literature.  Hence, 
the big 4 premium is persistent after closely matching on key auditee attributes (size, risk and complexity) 
and controlling for any remaining confounding influences via the use of OLS regression. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Since the seminal paper by Simunic (1980), a large number of studies have predicted and found that large 
auditors have commanded a premium for their services, possibly due to superior audit quality, ‘deep 
pockets’ and other reputational effects.  However, important innovations in the literature by Ireland and 
                                                      
24 For each iteration, we collected the p-value and t-statistic for mean differences between the big 4 and non-big 4 
samples for the four matching variables and out of the 2,000 iterations, there were no significant differences (at p < 
0.05) in the variables on which we matched.  More specifically, the range and mean for the absolute t-statistics, 
respectively, of the four variables were 0.31-0.56 and mean of 0.44 for lnSAL; 0.17-1.90 and mean of 1.07 for RTA; 
0.18-0.51 and mean of 0.34 for SQSUBS; and 0.02-0.04 with a mean of 0.04 for EXPSAL.  We also repeated this 
procedure by controlling for both sales and total assets (together with SUBS, EXPSAL and RTA) and obtained 
similar results (though inevitably on a smaller sample). 
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Lennox (2002) and Chaney et al. (2004) have challenged findings based on OLS regressions including a 
binary indicator variable for large auditors.  More specifically, the latter paper overturned much of the 
prior research by stating that given their firm specific characteristics, private UK companies that chose a 
big 5 auditor would have paid more had they chosen a non-big 5 auditor; thus leading to the conclusion 
that a large auditor premium does not exist and that the audit market is properly organised (ibid., p. 70). 
 Using a comprehensive sample of UK private firms, our results suggest that the Heckman 
procedure does not provide a panacea for estimating selection effects.  In particular, Chaney et alia’s 
(2004) finding that firms select the type of auditor that provides the cheapest service once unobservables 
are taken in account is unsupported by our analysis.  Second, the Heckman two-step method increasingly 
used in contemporary auditing research can be highly sensitive to model specification: we find no 
evidence of selection in the big 4 fees equation when sales are omitted and the selection effect doubles 
when there is no identifying variable.  Finally, our results are also sensitive to estimation technique.  In 
particular the selection effect for the maximum likelihood estimates differs dramatically from that 
obtained by the standard Heckman two-step method. 
 We also find that big 4 (non-big 4) firms without similar counterparts in the non-big 4 (big 4) 
samples have an influential affect on our Heckman results. When we re-estimated the models in the 
‘common support’ region – where big 4 and non-big 4 auditees have more similar characteristics – the big 
4 premium persists, but the coefficient on the IMR loses statistical significance for big 4 firms, again 
indicating that extant results may be sensitive to specification and/or a small sub-set of highly influential 
observations.  
When we employ a less restrictive and more robust matching approach to estimate the premium by 
comparing the audit fees for big 4 and non-big 4 auditees of a similar degree of size, risk and complexity, 
we find a persistent premium of a magnitude in line with that found in prior single-stage OLS audit fee 
studies.  Taken together with previous research which finds that large auditors produce higher quality 
audits (e.g., Lennox, 1999; Blokdijk et al., 2006) our results suggest that conclusions from Heckman-
based research that the big 4 premium vanishes once selection is allowed for should be treated with 
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caution.  Although the matching estimators we employ are highly robust to changes in model 
specification, unlike the Heckman approach they are (by definition) unable to take account of 
unobservable client characteristics.  Although prior analytical research suggests unobservable factors such 
as insider knowledge of future cash flows may be important in determining auditor choice, there is 
considerable disagreement on the direction of this effect (cf. Titman and Trueman, 1986 and Datar et al., 
1991).  A possible avenue for further work may be to identify and obtain empirical proxies for these 
unobservable characteristics, and to include such variables in less sensitive methods such as matching 
analysis.  
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TABLE 1  
Variable Definitions 
Label Definition 
lnAFEE Natural log of audit fee (in £) 
lnSAL Natural log of turnover (in £) 
lnTA Natural log of total assets (in £) 
SQSUBS Square root of the number of subsidiaries 
EXPSAL Ratio of non-UK turnover to total turnover 
QUALIF 
Binary variable taking the value of 1 if company had qualified audit report, 0 
otherwise 
PBAL 
Binary variable taking the value of 1 if company disclosed post-balance sheet event 
in accounts, 0 otherwise 
CONLIAB 
Binary variable taking the value of 1 if company disclosed contingent liabilities in 
accounts, 0 otherwise 
EXITEM 
Binary variable taking the value of 1 if company disclosed exceptional and/or 
extraordinary items in accounts, 0 otherwise 
RTA Ratio of profit before tax to total assets 
TLTA Ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
LOND Binary variable taking the value of 1 if company is located in London, 0 otherwise 
BUSY 
Binary variable taking the value of 1 if firm’s year-end is in December or March, 0 
otherwise 
BIG4 
Binary variable taking the value of 1 if company is audited by a big four auditor, 0 
otherwise 
CHTA Absolute value of change in total assets from year t-1 to year t 
TABLE 2  
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Big 4 clients  
(n = 3,038) 
Non Big 4 clients  
(n = 33,636) 
Total sample  
(n = 36,674) 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Median Mean 
Std. 
dev. Median Mean 
Std. 
dev. Median Sig. 
AFEE (£000) 29.05 80.47 13.00 5.88 13.12 2.75 7.80 27.11 3.00 ‡§ 
SAL (£m) 39.41 150.62 8.14 5.13 21.46 0.84 7.97 48.89 1.02 ‡§ 
TA (£m) 35.62 159.41 6.08 3.17 14.49 0.48 5.86 48.75 0.59 ‡§ 
SUBS 3.46 8.37 1.00 0.61 2.46 0.00 0.84 3.46 0.00 ‡§ 
EXPSAL 0.08 0.20 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.00 ‡§ 
QUALIF* 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.03 0.18 0.00  
PBAL* 0.12 0.33 0.00 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.04 0.21 0.00 y 
CONLIAB* 0.27 0.45 0.00 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.11 0.31 0.00 y 
EXITEM* 0.57 0.50 1.00 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.34 0.47 0.00 y 
RTA 0.01 0.38 0.03 0.23 0.78 0.07 0.21 0.76 0.07 ‡§ 
TLTA 0.84 1.51 0.73 0.77 1.15 0.66 0.78 1.18 0.67 ‡§ 
LOND* 0.21 0.41 0.00 0.34 0.47 0.00 0.33 0.47 0.00 y 
BUSY* 0.56 0.50 1.00 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.45 0.50 0.00 y 
CHTA (£m) 5.26 33.82 0.61 0.49 2.71 0.05 0.88 10.16 0.06 ‡§ 
Notes: 
‡ and § indicate means and distributions are significantly different between big 4 and non-big 4 clients at the 0.01 level 
in t-tests and Mann-Whitney tests respectively.  
y indicates significant difference between big 4 and non-big 4 clients at the 0.01 level in a chi-squared test. 
* Signifies a binary variable for which the mean describes the proportion of the sample taking a value of unity 
TABLE 3   
Regression Results 
 OLS Single Stage Models MLE Two Step Models Heckman Two  Step Models 
 
 
Model 1 
(Pooled) 
Model 2 
(Big 4) 
Model 3 
(Non-big 4) 
Model 4a 
(Probit) 
Model 5a 
(Big 4) 
Model 6a 
(Non-big 4) 
Model 4b 
(Probit) 
Model 5b 
(Big 4) 
Model 6b 
(Non-big 4) 
          
lnSAL 0.284 
(87.31)** 
0.285 
(25.08)** 
0.286 
(83.84)** 
-0.004 
(0.48) 
0.285 
(30.93)** 
0.286 
(96.44)** 
-0.005 
(0.50) 
0.285 
(29.51)** 
0.285 
(92.71)** 
lnTA 0.122 
(36.28)** 
0.120 
(10.30)** 
0.120 
(33.54)** 
0.246 
(23.25)** 
0.149 
(8.00)** 
0.113 
(34.86)** 
0.246 
(23.20)** 
0.211 
(5.41)** 
0.101 
(25.46)** 
SQSUBS 0.258 
(44.70)** 
0.201 
(19.07)** 
0.281 
(40.10)** 
0.087 
(6.98)** 
0.209 
(19.81)** 
0.268 
(46.05)** 
0.088 
(7.03)** 
0.227 
(15.28)** 
0.247 
(34.78)** 
EXPSAL 0.367 
(13.15)** 
0.627 
(10.91)** 
0.293 
(9.41)** 
0.607 
(9.84)** 
0.688 
(11.34)** 
0.253 
(8.98)** 
0.602 
(9.77)** 
0.822 
(8.36)** 
0.191 
(6.17)** 
QUALIF 0.115 
(6.18)** 
0.141 
(2.56)* 
0.111 
(5.58)** 
-0.146 
(2.61)** 
0.126 
(2.30)* 
0.118 
(6.06)** 
-0.146 
(2.61)** 
0.094 
(1.57) 
0.128 
(6.36)** 
PBAL 0.119 
(7.74)** 
0.179 
(5.65)** 
0.098 
(5.62)** 
0.169 
(4.23)** 
0.196 
(5.85)** 
0.084 
(4.69)** 
0.169 
(4.23)** 
0.233 
(5.62)** 
0.063 
(3.34)** 
CONLIAB 0.095 
(8.93)** 
0.064 
(2.64)** 
0.099 
(8.47)** 
0.014 
(0.48) 
0.064 
(2.57)* 
0.096 
(7.68)** 
0.013 
(0.45) 
0.066 
(2.45)* 
0.091 
(7.09)** 
EXITEM 0.131 
(17.04)** 
0.126 
(5.57)** 
0.130 
(15.88)** 
-0.081 
(3.38)** 
0.118 
(5.06)** 
0.133 
(16.14)** 
-0.080 
(3.35)** 
0.100 
(3.78)** 
0.137 
(15.99)** 
          
 45 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3 (continued) 
RTA -0.033 
(7.14)** 
-0.111 
(3.28)** 
-0.031 
(6.65)** 
-0.231 
(8.12)** 
-0.139 
(3.87)** 
-0.031 
(6.82)** 
-0.230 
(8.10)** 
-0.199 
(4.02)** 
-0.032 
(6.54)** 
TLTA 0.026 
(6.43)** 
-0.009 
(1.31) 
0.029 
(6.24)** 
0.076 
(9.07)** 
-0.004 
(0.48) 
0.025 
(8.04)** 
0.076 
(8.98)** 
0.007 
(0.59) 
0.019 
(5.38)** 
LOND 0.208 
(29.69)** 
0.338 
(12.38)** 
0.200 
(27.63)** 
-0.306 
(12.15)** 
0.306 
(9.93)** 
0.210 
(29.10)** 
-0.305 
(12.11)** 
0.237 
(4.72)** 
0.226 
(27.93)** 
BUSY 0.011 
(1.76) 
0.010 
(0.52) 
0.010 
(1.51) 
0.153 
(7.12)** 
0.026 
(1.18) 
0.004 
(0.63) 
0.152 
(7.10)** 
0.0601 
(2.01)* 
-0.005 
(0.65) 
BIG4 0.270 
(22.96)** 
        
CHTA    0.007 
(4.17)** 
  0.007 
(4.27)** 
  
IMR (l) 
(sSBIG or sSNON) 
    0.142 
(1.80) 
-0.199 
(9.56)** 
 0.446 
(2.42)** 
-0.509 
(8.39)** 
CONSTANT 2.299 
(88.49)** 
2.638 
(23.07)** 
2.302 
(83.80)** 
-4.886 
(46.58)** 
1.967 
(5.14)** 
2.378 
(87.60)** 
-4.870 
(46.62)** 
0.511 
(0.58) 
2.499 
(69.11)** 
Observations 36674 3038 33636 36674 3038 33636 36674 3038 33636 
Adj. R-squared 0.78 0.80 0.75     0.80 0.75 
Notes: 
* and ** indicate significance at 5% and 1% respectively.  The absolute value of the t-statistic is shown in parentheses. The probit estimates for the ML models are for the big 4 
selection model.  For Models 4b-6b, z-statistics are in parentheses (based on the method proposed by Greene (1981) for Models 5 & 6). 
  
TABLE 4 
Effects of Changes in Specification on Heckman Two-Step Models 
Specification†  Cond. Mean 
or 
Difference 
(=ATT) 
Uncond. 
Mean or 
Difference 
(=ATE) 
Selection 
Effect 
Coefficient of 
Selection 
Term (l) 
(sSBIG/sSNON) 
R2 § 
Preferred       
a. MLE Big 4 9.4364 9.2268 0.2096 0.142 
(1.80) 
0.986 
Fees: Full model Non-Big 4 8.8230 9.1174 -0.2944 -0.199 
(9.56)** 
0.854 
Probit: Full model Difference 0.6134 0.1094 
(0.93) 
0.5040 
(4.20)** 
  
       
b. Heckman Big 4 9.4364 8.7761 0.6603 0.446 
(2.42) * 
0.986 
Fees: Full model Non-Big 4 8.2635 9.0180 -0.7545 -0.509 
(8.39) ** 
0.858 
Probit: Full model Difference 1.1729 
 
-0.2419 
(-0.88) 
1.4148 
(4.92)** 
  
No identifying 
variable 
      
c. MLE  Big 4 9.4364 9.1898 0.2465 0.166 
(2.31)* 
0.992 
Fees: Full model Non-Big 4 8.8125 9.1154 -0.3029 -0.204 
(10.00)** 
0.868 
Probit: Excludes 
(CHTA) 
Difference 0.6239 0.0744 
(0.69) 
0.5495 
(4.95)** 
  
       
d. Heckman Big 4 9.4364 7.8345 1.6019 1.079 
(3.74)** 
0.992 
Fees: Full model Non-Big 4 8.1070 8.9895 -0.8825 -0.595 
(9.22)** 
0.874 
Probit: Excludes 
(CHTA) 
Difference 1.3294 
 
-1.1551 
(-2.69) ** 
2.4845 
(5.66)** 
  
No Sales variable       
e. MLE Big 4 9.4364 9.3588 0.0776 0.052 
(0.45) 
0.986 
Fees: Exc. lnSAL Non-Big 4 8.8845 9.1174 -0.2330 -0.157 
(7.12)** 
0.854 
Probit: Exc. lnSAL, 
Conliab 
Difference 0.5520 0.2414 
(1.38) 
0.3106 
(1.76) 
  
       
f. Heckman Big 4 9.4364 9.2961 0.1404 0.095 
(0.51) 
0.986 
Fees: Exc. lnSAL Non-Big 4 7.8456 8.9330 -1.0874 -0.734 
(10.89)** 
0.857 
Probit: Excludes 
lnSAL, Conliab 
Difference 1.5909 0.3631 
(1.30) 
1.2278 
(4.14)** 
  
Notes: Differences ATT=ATE+Selection Effect.   
†The figures in parenthesis in the columns labelled ‘conditional’ and ‘unconditional’ are the t-values for the difference in 
predicted log fees.  In the case of MLE we could only extract the information for the computation of the variance-covariance 
matrix for the difference in the unconditional means.   
‡ The figures in parentheses in the column ‘selection effect’ are t-values for the estimate of the coefficient of the selection term. 
§  The column labelled R2 shows the R2 for a regression of the l on the remaining regressors in the fees equation. 
  
 
 
 
TABLE 5  
Effects of Changes in Sample on Heckman Models 
Row Sample definitions Lambda 
 
 Pr(Big 4=1) Pr(Non Big4=1) Big 4 Non Big4 
1. All All 0.142 (1.80) 
-0.199 
(9.56)** 
2. Largest 95% All 0.133 (1.66) 
-0.231 
(12.60) ** 
3. Largest 90% All 0.144 (1.82) 
-0.247 
(14.22) ** 
     
4. Largest 95% Largest 95% 0.100 (2.31) * 
-0.229 
(11.58) ** 
5. Largest 90% Largest 90% 0.063 (2.07) * 
-0.212 
(9.36) ** 
     
6. Middle 90% All -0.009 (-0.09) 
-0.238 
(13.27) ** 
7. Middle 90% Middle 90% 0.053 (0.98) 
-0.225 
(10.34) ** 
8. Middle 80% Middle 80% 0.022 (0.45) 
-0.216 
(8.37) ** 
Notes: 
t-values are in parentheses 
**, * represent statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level respectively 
All models use the full model specification (see Table 3) for the probit and audit fee equations. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6 
  Propensity Score Matched Results† 
 
 Nearest 
Neighbour (with 
replacement) 
Nearest 
Neighbour (no 
replacement) 
Caliper of 0.001 
(absolute 
difference in p-
score) 
Caliper of 0.0001 
(absolute 
difference in p-
score) 
Mean difference 0.2642 0.3082 0.2531 0.2613 
Big 4 premium‡ 30.2% 36.1% 28.8% 29.9% 
z-statistic 8.23** 15.58** 12.54** 10.91** 
N§ 6076 6076 5586 4814 
Mean absolute 
difference in p-score 0.0003 0.2393 0.0001 0.0000 
Minimum absolute 
difference in p-score 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Maximum absolute 
difference in p-score 0.3960 0.6848 0.0010 0.0001 
Notes 
† The probit selection model from which propensity scores (p-scores) are derived is reported in Table 3 (Model 4). 
‡ Results are based on bootstrapped standard errors (50 replications).  Premium is the difference between the mean 
lnAFEE for big 4 auditors minus the mean lnAFEE for their matched big 4 counterparts. 
§ Note that each method results in an equal number of matched big 4 and non-big 4 auditees. 
**  represents statistical significance at the 0.01 level 
 
  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 7 
Pre-processed Portfolio Matched Regression Results 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
BIG4 coefficient† 0.2724 0.0114 0.2724 0.2369 0.3091 
Big 4 premium‡ 31.3% - 31.3% 26.7% 36.2% 
BIG4 t-statistic 13.73 0.5652 13.73 11.98 15.51 
F-Value 832.58 30.15 833.24 717.57 926.04 
Adjusted R2 0.7679 0.0040 0.7679 0.7544 0.7792 
Notes 
†  Big4 coefficient is the estimated coefficient from each iteration of a random sample of companies matched 
on the basis of sales (40 portfolios), exports to sales (11 portfolios), return on total assets (40 portfolios) and 
the number of subsidiaries (10 portfolios) from Model 1, Table 3.  The number of portfolios for the ratio of 
exports to sales and number of subsidiaries differs due to a large number of zero values for each variable. 
‡ Based on 2000 iterations where each iteration involves a regression on a total sample of 3,656 companies 
(i.e., 1,828 big 4 and 1,828 non-big4 auditees).  The t-statistic in each iteration is based on White’s (1980) 
correction for heteroskedasticity. 
 
  
